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The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved
problems in social cognitive science. Although no other
concept is invoked more frequently in the social
sciences, we still know little about how social norms
are formed, the forces determining their content, and
the cognitive and emotional requirements that enable a
species to establish and enforce social norms. In recent
years, there has been substantial progress, however, on
how cooperation norms are enforced. Here we review
evidence showing that sanctions are decisive for norm
enforcement, and that they are largely driven by non-
selﬁsh motives. Moreover, the explicit study of sanc-
tioning behavior provides instruments for measuring
social norms and has also led to deeper insights
into the proximate and ultimate forces behind human
cooperation.
Human societies represent a spectacular outlier with
respect to all other animal species because they are based
on large-scale cooperation among genetically unrelated
individuals [1]. In most animal societies, cooperation is
either orders of magnitude less developed compared with
humans, or it is based on substantial genetic relatedness.
Cooperation in human societies is mainly based on social
norms, including in modern societies, where a consider-
able amount of cooperation is due to the legal enforcement
of rules. Legal enforcement mechanisms cannot function
unless they are based on a broad consensus about the
normative legitimacy of the rules – in other words, unless
the rules are backed by social norms. Moreover, the very
existence of legal enforcement institutions is itself a
product of prior norms about what constitutes appropriate
behaviour. Thus, it is necessary to explain social norms to
explain human cooperation.
Social norms are standards of behaviour that are based
on widely shared beliefs how individual group members
ought to behave in a given situation [2–5]. The group in
whichsocialnormsprevailcanbeafamily,apeergroup,an
organization or even a whole society. The group members
might obey the norm voluntarily if their individual goals
are in line with the normatively required behaviour, or
they might be forced to obey the norm because their
individual goals differ from the normatively required
behavior, in which case the enforcement of the norm
presupposes that norm violations are punished. According
to a widely shared [6] but not uncontested [7] view, the
demand for a social norm arises when actions cause
positive or negative side-effects for other people. Environ-
mental pollution, or an individual employee’s effort when
the team is paid according to the team’s total output, are
examples that lead to such side-effects. In the team case, a
member who contributes to the team’s output also raises
the pay of the other members. It is therefore in the interest
of each individual team member that the other members
work hard. This interest in the others’ actions is alleged to
create the demand for a social norm.
Positive or negative side-effects of individual actions
typicallygiverisetoacooperationor‘public-good’problem.
The deﬁning characteristic of a public good, such as clean
air or team output, is that no group member can be
excluded from the consumption of the good. Therefore, all
parties are better off if the public good is provided and the
groupmemberssharethecost,buteachindividualalsohas
an economic incentive to free ride; that is, to contribute
nothing towards providing the good (see Box 1). This
meansthatifthegroupmembersbehaveaccordingtotheir
economic incentives, they do not cooperate and, therefore,
the public good will not be provided. It is clear that a social
norm such as ‘You should not take advantage of your team
members by shirking’ contributes to the provision of the
public good.
Box 1. Public goods and Prisoners’ Dilemma experiments
By deﬁnition, all group members can consume a public good, even
thosewhodonotbearthecostofprovidingthegood.Therefore,each
memberhasanincentivetofreerideonthecontributionsofothers.In
a public good experiment, subjects form groups of n $ 2 individuals
and each individual is given a monetary endowment E. Subjects
simultaneously decide how much of E they keep for themselves and
how much they spend on a group project. The experimenter then
multiplies the total amount spent on the group project by a number,
denotedbyb,thatisgreaterthan1butsmallerthann.Themultiplied
sum of the member’s contribution constitutes theproceeds from the
group project. These proceeds are then distributed equally among
the n members. This means that each group member, including the
contributingsubject,earnsb/nMUsforeverymoneyunit(MU)spent
on the project; this is less than 1 because of b , n. Yet, the con-
tributing subject has a cost of 1, meaning that a selﬁsh subject never
contributes anything to the project in a one-shot experiment. This
prediction holds, although it would be collectively rational to con-




if E ¼ 20, b ¼ 2, subjects earn 20 if nobody contributes and 40 if
everybody contributes the whole endowment to the group project.
Formally, the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) is a special case of the
public-goodgamewithn ¼ 2andtwoavailableactions:contributing
nothing (i.e. defect) or contributing everything (i.e. cooperate).
Therefore, each player in the PD is better off if he defects (because
b/n ¼ b/2 , 1) regardless of what the opponent does.
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In this article, we review evidence to suggest that human
cooperation is largely based on a social norm of conditional
cooperation. This norm prescribes cooperation if the other
group members also cooperate, whereas the defection of
others is a legitimate excuse for individual defection. The
norm is violated if an individual defects even though the
other group members cooperated. The social norm of
conditional cooperation provides a proximate mechanism
behind the famous tit-for-tat strategy that has been
assumed in many evolutionary models [8–10]. To provide
evidence for the existence of conditional cooperation, it is
ﬁrst shown that a large percentage of experimental
subjects indeed obey the norm. Second, it is shown that
norm violators incur punishment.
Evidence for conditional cooperation comes from seve-
ral experiments in which individuals interact anony-
mously with each other in a one-shot experiment and
wherereal moneyisatstake(seeBox1[11–13]).Typically,
a majority of the subjects behaves in a conditionally
cooperative manner; that is, they increase their contri-
bution to the public good if the average contribution of the
other group members increases (Figure 1). However, there
is also a substantial minority of subjects who never
contribute anything to the public good. This suggests
that discipline ofthe selﬁsh group membersis necessary to
enforce widespread cooperation because these members
are unwilling to pay for the public good in the absence of
sanctions. In addition, it is important to recognize that
most subjects who exhibit conditional cooperation are not
perfectconditionalcooperators.Theydocooperateifothers
also cooperate, but they cooperate less than the others,
suggesting that self-interest mitigates adherence to the
norm of conditional cooperation. In the absence of sanc-
tions for non-cooperation, this pattern of conditional
cooperation – in combination with the existence of
complete free riders – is likely to cause decreasing
contributions over time. High and stable cooperation
levels cannot be maintained if the majority of subjects
wants to contribute below the average contribution of the
other group members.
The third-party punishment experiment [14], in which
a third subject observes the behavior of two subjects who
play the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), is a useful tool for
examining whether violations of the conditional coopera-
tion norm are sanctioned. A PD can be viewed as a public
goods gamewith two players in which eachplayer has only
two actions: cooperation or defection (see Box 1). If both
players defect, the public good is not provided. If both
players cooperate, the good is provided and the costs are
sharedequally,renderingbothplayersbetteroffrelativeto
mutual defection. However, every player has an economic
incentive to deviate from mutual cooperation by consum-
ing the public good but letting the other player pay for it.
In the third-party punishment experiment, the two PD
players ﬁrst decided simultaneously whether to cooperate
or to defect. Then the third subject, who had a monetary
endowment, was informed about both players’ actions.
Subsequently, the third subject could sanction one, two, or
none of the PD players. In reality, sanctions are not
costless for the punishing subject. Costs associated with
punishing others include the risk of retaliation or at least
the potential loss of relationship, the loss of time or money,
emotional tensions, and so forth. For this reason, the third
party in the experiment incurred a cost if he or she
punished a PD player. Each money unit (MU) that the
third subject spent on the punishment of a PD player
reduced the payoff of the punished PD player by 3 MUs.
Third-party punishment experiments are perfectly
suited to study the existence of social norms because the
other players’ actions do not affect the third subject’s
economic payoff in any way. The third party is just a
passive observer of events that occur in the interaction
between other parties. Therefore, the third party has no
reason for punishing any of the other players unless a
social norm is violated. In fact, because punishment is
costly for the third party, and because there are no future
beneﬁts from punishing because the experiment is one-
shot and the subjects interact anonymously with each
other, the desire to punish norm violations has to be strong
enough to overcome the third party’s self-interest. This
meansthatifpunishmentby‘disinterested’thirdpartiesis
observed, one can conclude that there is a strong social
norm behind the desire to punish. Third-party punish-
ment experiments have not only been used to study the
strength and existence of cooperation norms but also for
the study of distribution norms [14–16].
In the PD experiments with third-party punishment,
roughly50%ofthesubjectsin theroleofathirdpartywere
willing to punish defection of PD players, whereas the
punishment of cooperative choices was virtually absent
(Box 2). Moreover, defection was punished much more
severely if the other PD player cooperated than if the other
PD player defected. This indicates that mutual defection is
considered muchless (if at all)as a normviolation whereas
unilateral defection is considered to merit substantial
punishment.
Figure 1. Fischbacher et al. [11] elicited subjects’ willingness to contribute to a
public good, conditional on the average contribution of the other group members.
A group consisted of four members and each member could contribute up to 20
‘experimental’ money units (MUs) to a public good. At the end of the experiment,
the MUs were converted into real money according to a publicly known exchange
rate (1 MU ¼ $0.30). A selﬁsh member will never contribute anything in this experi-
ment. Despite the economic incentives to contribute nothing, 50% of the subjects
raised their contributions if the average contribution of the other members
increased (red data plot); 14% exhibited a hump-shaped contribution pattern as a
function of others’ average contribution (green plot); 30% of the subjects never
contributed anything (blue plot); the remaining 6% of the subjects exhibited very
irregular contribution patterns. Redrawn from [11] with permission.
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 












































Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.8 No.4 April 2004 186
www.sciencedirect.comThe impact of sanctioning opportunities on cooperation
What are the conditions under which the norm of
conditional cooperation enables groups to establish high
and stable cooperation? The existence of a large minority
of selﬁsh individuals who violate cooperation norms
suggests the need for credible sanctioning threats. In
fact, a large amount of evidence [17,18] indicates that
stable cooperation is rarely attained in ﬁnitely repeated
public-goods experiments with anonymous interactions
and stable group membership where the selﬁsh choice is
full defection. Typically, there is substantial cooperation in
the ﬁrst few periods but over time levels of cooperation
decrease, and little cooperation is observed in the ﬁnal
periods (Figure 2).
There are, however, several studies indicating that the
addition of sanctioning opportunities and the associated
actual sanctioning behaviour has a powerful impact on
cooperation rates in these experiments [19–24]. Although
the available studies differ in detail, the typical set up is as
follows: groups of n individuals (where n . 2) are involved
in an anonymous public-goods experiment for, say, 10
roughly equal periods of time. In each period, the group
members ﬁrst simultaneously decide how much to con-
tribute. Then all group members are informed about
everybody else’s contribution (without revealing personal
identities), upon which everybody can punish everybody
else in the group. Every MU invested into punishment
decreases the punished member’s monetary payoff by
2–4 MUs. This punishment opportunity usually has a
decisive impact on cooperation behaviour. Cooperation
decreases if the subjects ﬁrst conduct an experiment
without the opportunity to punish. However, if the same
subjects subsequently have the opportunity of punishing,
cooperation ﬂourishes (Figure 2). A large increase in
cooperation levels already occurs in the very ﬁrst period
after the punishment option is introduced. Moreover, the
punishment opportunity not only avoids the decrease
in cooperation in the subsequent periods, but even leads
to an increase in cooperation. Almost full cooperation is
achieved in the ﬁnal periods. These results are also robust
relative to a change in the order of treatments [23]. If the
punishment opportunity comes ﬁrst, cooperation ﬂourishes;
cooperation breaks down following its removal.
There are two likely reasons that contribute to the
positive impact of the punishment opportunity on coope-
ration levels. First, a majority of the subjects is willing
to punish low contributors; that is, there is a credible
punishment threat which disciplines the selﬁsh subjects
and the imperfect conditional cooperators (Figure 3). The
data also indicate a punishment pattern that is consistent
with the norm for conditional cooperation. Those subjects
who contribute less than the average contribution of the
other group members are heavily punished whereas those
who contribute more receive almost no punishment. In
addition, the punishment of below-average contributors
increases with their deviation from the group average.
Second, because the selﬁsh subjects can be disciplined, the
norm-abiding subjects can be sure that the other group
members will cooperate at high levels. In order words, the
punishment opportunity and the associated punishment
acts generate a belief that the other group members will
cooperate at high levels, and this belief induces the con-
ditionalcooperatorstocooperatevoluntarilyathighlevels.
Motives behind informal sanctions
No concept in modern game theory presumes that people
are selﬁsh. If individual preferences are modeled in game
theory, the only requirement is that individuals behave
according to consistent goals – irrespective of whether the
Box 2. Third-party punishment
In Fehr and Fischbacher [14], a third party observes the behavior
of players in the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD). Then the third party has
the option of punishing the PD players. Table I shows the average
amount of experimental money (in experimental money units; MU)
that an ‘impartial’ third party spends on the punishment of subjects
in the PD. At the end of the experiment, MUs are converted into real
money at a known exchange rate (1 MU ¼ $0.37). Subjects who
cooperate in the PD are almost never punished by third parties
whereas defectors are punished. 45.8% of the third parties (n ¼ 24)
punishadefectorwhosepartnercooperated.20.8%punishadefector
whose partner also defected. However,the punishment of adefector
is much stronger if the other player in the PD cooperated than if the
other player in the PD defected indicating a norm of conditional
cooperation.
Table I. Number of money units (MUs)spent bya third party
in punishing a player in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
Punished
player is a:
Other player in the
PD is a defector
Other player in the
PD is a cooperator
Defector 0.583 (20.8%) 3.354 (45.8%)
Cooperator 0.063 (8.3%) 0.083 (4.2%)
Amounts shown are experimental money units. In parentheses is the
percentage of third parties who punish.
Figure 2. Fehr and Ga ¨chter [23] studied the impact of punishment opportunities on
cooperation rates in a public-goods experiment. The ﬁgure shows subjects’ aver-
age contributions to the public good (as a percentage of their endowment) over
time. During the ﬁrst ten, roughly equal time periods, no punishment was pos-
sible. During periods 11–20, group members could punish each other after they
observed each member’s contribution level. At the beginning of the experiment
cooperation rates of roughly 50% of the endowment were observed, but levels of
cooperation decreased over time. The majority of subjects contributed nothing to
the public good in period 10, and the rest contributed little. In period 11, the sub-
jects were informed that a new experiment would start in which they would have
the opportunity to punish the other group members at a cost to themselves. This
modiﬁcation immediately increased cooperation levels to 65% of the endowment.
Then, over time, cooperation rose dramatically,until almost 100% cooperation was
attained. Redrawn from [23] with permission.
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www.sciencedirect.comgoals are self-regarding or not. Game theory assumes that
each actor maximizes utility, given the other actors’
choices, but it does not deﬁne what matters for utility. In
practice, however, the vast majority of game-theory
applications assume that all people care only for their
economic self-interest. This literature has led to important
theoretical insights into the patterns of interactions
and sanctions that are required for the enforcement of
cooperation in inﬁnitely repeated public goods situations
[25]. According to the self-interest approach, the self-
interest of the parties involved drives informal sanctions.
However, this approach has never been able to grasp the
normative and emotional components of social norms
and the resulting actual driving forces behind informal
sanctions. The evidence in the third-party punishment
experiment contrasts sharply with the predictions of the
self interest approach: self-interest cannot drive third-
party sanctions because all players involved remain
anonymous and there is no future interaction between
the players whatsoever.
Inprinciple,thesanctionsintheﬁnitelyrepeatedpublic
goods game with a stable group composition (Figure 3)
could be driven by self-interest because punished group
members typically increase their contributions in future
periods. Thus, by punishing low cooperation in period t,
the punishing member can beneﬁt from the punished
member’s higher cooperation in future periods. This
possibility for self-interested sanctions is removed if no
individual ever interacts with any other individual more
than once in the public-goods experiment. In this condi-
tion, all sanctions can be attributed to non-selﬁsh motives.
This means that if stronger sanctions prevail in a treat-
ment with a stable group composition versus one with a
randomly changing group composition (ensuring that no
subject ever meets any other subject more than once),
there is evidence for selﬁshly motivated sanctions. The
evidence shows, however, that a stable group composition
does not generate signiﬁcantly higher sanctions compared
with a treatment with randomly changing group compo-
sition (Figure 4) [23,24]. The strength of the sanctions is
only slightly and insigniﬁcantly higher in the condition
with a stable group composition. This result is consistent
withquestionnaireevidenceshowingthatpeople’smotives
for sentencing criminals are found in the area of ‘just
desserts’ rather than deterrence [26]. Thus, in contrast to
the conventional assumptions made in game theoretic
analyses of sanctioning behaviour, there is little evidence
of self-interested sanctions whereas there is much evi-
dence for non-selﬁshly motivated sanctions.
This raises questions about the motives behind the
non-selﬁsh sanctions. Subjects might punish because they
want to establish more egalitarian outcomes [27] or
because they view unilateral defection as an unfair
act that violates the conditional cooperation norm and
thus deserves retaliation [28–31]. The evidence suggests
that the desire to re-establish equality does not drive
the majority of non-selﬁsh sanctions (A. Falk et al.,
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp059.pdf). This can be
concluded from the fact that subjects punish even in those
situations where the sanctions do not change the payoff
differences betweenthe punished and thepunishing group
member. In the case of the sanctions displayed in Figure 4,
for example, the costs of the sanctions were the same for
the punishing andthe punished subject:eachMUinvested
into punishment reduced the payoff of the punished group
Figure 3. Punishment of group members is conditional on their deviation from the
average contribution of the other group members. The horizontal axis indicates
the deviation in discrete intervals of an individuals’ contribution from the average
contribution of the other three group members. The punishment points that are
assigned to an individual by the other three group members are shown on the
vertical axis. Every member’s monetary payoff was reduced by 10% for every
punishment point assigned to him. Negative deviations from the other group
members’ average contribution are strongly punished: a negative deviation in the
interval [220,214] results in the deviator’s income being reduced by almost 70%
by the other group members. If an individual’s deviation is in the interval [22,þ2]
punishment is negligible. Similarly, if an individual deviates positively from
others’ group average punishment is small. Modiﬁed from [23], with permission.
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Figure 4. Falk et al. studied the impact of self-regarding motives on punishment
in a repeated public-goods experiment. The horizontal axis indicates the deviation
in discrete intervals of the punished individual’s contribution from the punisher’s
contribution. The vertical axis measures the strength of punishment imposed
by individual group members. For every punishment point that an individual
assigned to another group member, the punisher and the punished subject had to
pay 1 MU. The data shown are based on periods 1–5 of an experiment that lasted
six periods. The last period is excluded because punishment can never be moti-
vated by self-regarding motives in the last period. If the group composition is
stable, however, a group member can beneﬁt from punishing defectors in the ﬁrst
ﬁve periods because the defectors increase their contributions to the public good
in the future. If the group composition changes randomly in every period so that
no subject meets any other subject more than once, a subject can never reap a
selﬁsh beneﬁt from punishing defectors. However, the strength of punishment is
roughly the same in both conditions, indicating that selﬁsh motives play little role
in the punishment of defectors. Data from Falk et al., in press, http://www.iew.
unizh.ch/wp/iewwp059.pdf.
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www.sciencedirect.commember by exactly 1 MU. Despite this ‘unfavorable’
punishment technology, punishment was still wide
spread and strong.
The absence of evidence for selﬁshly motivated sanc-
tions does not mean that self-interest plays no role at all in
sanctioning behavior. From an economic viewpoint, one
would expect that as the costs of sanctions increase for
the sanctioning subject, there will be fewer and weaker
sanctions. Recent research has shown that this is indeed
the case (C.M. Anderson and L. Putterman, unpublished;
J.P. Carpenter, unpublished). Thus, as the sanctioning
subjects have to give up more of their own payoff to
sanction others, they punish less, indicating that they
tradeoff theirowneconomicpayoff withthenon-pecuniary
‘beneﬁts’ of sanctioning others. This fact is also important
with respect to how one views and analyzes social norms.
It is apparently wrong to assume that social norms
are followed or enforced regardless of the cost of norm
adherence and norm enforcement. If norm adherence or
norm enforcement becomes more costly, norms are more
likely to break down. From a methodological viewpoint
this also means that norms can be analyzed by suitably
adjusted game theoretic models. These models assume
that people are not only motivated by economic self-
interest but also by norms of fairness and reciprocity
[27–33]. Recent studies on the neurobiology of cooperation
[34]andpunishment[35]areconsistentwiththesemodels.
The evolution of human cooperation
The human capacity to establish and enforce social norms
isperhapsthedecisivereasonfortheuniquenessofhuman
cooperation in the animal world [36]. The evidence indi-
cates that other animals largely lack the cognitive and
emotional capacities that are necessary for social norms
[37,38]. In comparison with humans, most animals have
a very high rate of time discounting, lack the ability of
precise numerical discrimination, exhibit serious memory
constraints or lack inhibitory control [38]. Therefore,
powerful ultimate forces, that probably had little impact
on animal evolution [38,39], supported the evolution of
cooperation in humans. Reciprocal altruism [8], reputation-
based altruism [40,41], and punishment-based altruism
[42] are much more likely to generate successful coope-
ration norms if the actors are less impatient, exhibit
inhibitory controls and are less constrained by memory
limits. In addition, cultural group selection is also likely
to be more important among humans because of human
cognitive capacities [42–46]. The rationale for this is
simple and can be illustrated in the context of the public-
goods experiments. If there is a punishment opportunity,
as was likely the case in hunter gatherer groups, selﬁsh
types do not ﬂourish because they are sanctioned. Social
norms and the associated sanctions remove the within
group selection advantage of norm violators and favor the
selection of norm-abiding behaviors within the groups.
There is abundant anthropological evidence indicating
that human groups differ greatly in their social norms
[47,48]. Thus, the existence of social norms creates con-
formity within groups and heterogeneity across groups.
This provides the raw material for cultural group selection
to become effective because it requires the existence of
persistent differences between groups plus the plausible
assumption that groups with more cooperative norms are
more likely to prevail in group conﬂicts.
Conclusions and outstanding questions
It is not possible to understand the peculiarities and the
forces behind human cooperation unless we understand
social norms. Experimental evidence indicates the exist-
ence of a norm of conditional cooperation. If other group
members cooperate, the norm also requires us to coope-
rate; if others defect we are also allowed to defect.
‘Disinterested’ third parties frequently punish violations
of the conditional cooperation norm for non-selﬁsh reasons.
More generally, non-selﬁshly motivated punishment con-
stitutes a powerful device for the enforcement of social
norms and human cooperation. Despite some recent pro-
gress in the analysis of social norms [48–51], a long
journey still remains until science will be able to provide a
satisfactory understanding. Although it is known that
emotions are likely to play a key role in cooperation [34]
and punishment decisions [24,35], we still do not know
whether they drive these decisions or whether they are
merely associated with these decisions. A related problem
is that the neural underpinnings of social norms are still
largely uninvestigated. There is also a decisive lack of
knowledge regarding the social and the economic deter-
minants of social norms. The socio-economic environment
shapes the costs and beneﬁts of cooperation and punish-
ment and is thus likely to be an important determinant of
social norms but empirically as well as theoretically we
still know little about this. More knowledge in this area is
likelytohelp ustounderstandwhichenvironmentislikely
to favor which norms and thus, when norms are stable and
when they will change.
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